Corporations by West, Glenn D. & Fairman, Christopher M.
SMU Law Review
Volume 53





Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation






I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 774
II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS ........................... 774
A. HONORING THE CORPORATE FORM ................... 774
1. Louis v. Discount Tire Co. of Texas, Inc ........... 774
2. Pellow v. Cade .................................... 775
B. DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE FORM ............... 775
1. H all v. Tim m ons .................................. 776
2. Seminole Pipeline Co. v. Broad Leaf Partners,
Inc . .. .......... .................................. 777
3. Gardemal v. Westin Hotel Co ...................... 778
C. DRAFTING CORPORATE AGREEMENTS ................. 778
1. M.D. Mark, Inc. v. Nuevo Energy Co .............. 779
2. TXO Production Co. v. M.D. Mark, Inc ........... 780
3. Boustany v. Monsanto Co ......................... 783
D. JURISDICTION AND VENUE ............................ 783
1. Jurisdiction over the Corporation .................. 783
a. Jones v. Beech Aircraft Corp .................. 784
b. Mink v. AAAA Development LLC ........... 785
c. Cole v. Tobacco Institute ...................... 786
d. BHP de Venezuela, C.A. v. Castieg ........... 787
e. J & J M arine, Inc. v. Le ....................... 788
f. Transportacion Especial Autorizada, S.A. de
C.V. v. Seguros Comercial America, S.A. de
C.V ......... ......................... 788
2. The Meaning of "Principal Office" . ............... 789
a. In re Missouri Pacific Railroad Co ............. 789
b. TV-3, Inc. v. Regal Insurance Co. of
A m erica ....................................... 790
E. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS ................. 791
1. Pace v. Jordan ..................................... 791
* Glenn D. West is a Partner in the Corporate Department of Weil, Gotshal &
Manges LLP in Dallas, Texas.
** Christopher M. Fairman is an Assistant Professor of Law at the Ohio State Univer-
sity College of Law.
Messrs. West and Fairman express special thanks to S. Scott Parel and Elena A. Petkova,
both associates in the Corporate Department of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP in Dallas,
Texas, for their assistance with this Article.
SMU LAW REVIEW
2. Christian ICG Telecom Canada, Inc ................ 793
III. LEGISLATIVE HIGHLIGHTS: IN ANTICIPATION OF
THE TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS CODE ... 795
I. INTRODUCTION
HERE were several interesting corporate law cases decided by
Texas courts1 during the survey period. 2 Grouped into categories
of those that deal with (i) honoring the corporate form, (ii) disre-
garding the corporate form, (iii) drafting of corporate agreements, (iv)
jurisdiction over and venue for corporations, and (v) shareholder deriva-
tive actions, Section II of this article presents summaries of these cases.
Although the 76th Texas Legislature was in session during the survey pe-
riod, there were no remarkable amendments or enactments relating to
Texas corporations. The much anticipated H.B. 2681, 3 which proposes to
recodify and consolidate most Texas business organization statutes, was
presented too late in the session to be passed. Since H.B. 2681 is ex-
pected to emerge from the next legislative session, Section III of this arti-
cle includes a brief description of the bill.
II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. HONORING THE CORPORATE FORM
A survey of the law of corporations should begin with a discussion of
the corporate form and the obligation of the courts to honor that form.
Fortunately, during this survey period two courts of appeals had the op-
portunity to address the issue of the corporate form and its sanctity. Not
unexpectedly, these courts reaffirmed the long-standing rule that the cor-
porate entity is a creature of statute, separate and distinct from its share-
holders, and that few facts and circumstances warrant an exception to this
rule.4
1. Louis v. Discount Tire Co. of Texas, Inc.5
In Louis, the Amarillo Court of Appeals reviewed plaintiff Rita Louis's
attempt to bring a negligence cause of action against corporate defendant
Discount Tire one day after the applicable statute of limitations for such
1. For purposes of this article, "Texas courts" include decisions by federal district
courts sitting in Texas and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit inter-
preting Texas law where appropriate. Since we limited the scope of our survey to Texas
law issues, federal cases focusing on purely federal issues affecting the corporation, such as
federal securities litigation, are not addressed.
2. October 1, 1998 through September 31, 1999.
3. Tex. H.B. 2681, 76th Leg., C.S. (1999).
4. See, e.g., Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKee, 943 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex. 1997);
Western Horizontal Drilling, Inc. v. Jonnett Energy Corp., 11 F.3d 65, 67 (5th Cir. 1994);
Home Motors, Inc. v. Latimer, 148 S.W.2d 1000, 1003 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1941, writ
dism'd).
5. 1 S.W.3d 698 (Tex App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.).
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claim had lapsed. Louis argued that since the corporation's registered
agent was absent from the state for at least one day during the two-year
limitations period, the trial court's entry of summary judgment for Dis-
count Tire should be overturned. Citing a nineteenth-century Texas Su-
preme Court case, Sherman v. Buffalo Bayou, Brazos, and Colorado R.R.
Co.,6 the court of appeals affirmed the trial court ruling that a corpora-
tion carrying on its business in Texas is not considered absent from the
state merely because its officers or its registered agent are absent from
the state since "a corporation is not its officers and officers are not the
corporation." 7
2. Pellow v. Cade8
At issue in Pellow was whether a suit brought against a corporation
could be maintained if the corporation had dissolved thirty years earlier.
Citing the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Hunter v. Fort Worth Capi-
tal Corp.,9 the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the three-year sur-
vival period set forth in Article 7.12 of the Texas Business Corporation
Act is the exclusive method of recovering against a dissolved corpora-
tion.10 Absent such statute, "no claim exists against a dissolved corpora-
tion or its shareholders."' If a plaintiff fails to bring an action within the
time limits of the applicable survival statute, "there is no longer an entity
that can be sued.' 2
B. DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE FORM
Notwithstanding the general reluctance of the courts to disregard the
corporate form, officers, directors, and shareholders of corporations are
frequently subjected to suits seeking to impose personal liability on them.
As in years past, this survey period was not without its handful of share-
6. 21 Tex. 349 (1858).
7. Louis, 1 S.W.3d at 700. On the other hand, as other cases decided during the
survey period noted, a corporation can only act through its officers and agents, who are
generally not responsible personally for actions they take on behalf of the corporation. See
Powell Indus., Inc. v. Allen, 985 S.W.2d 455,457 (Tex. 1998); GTE Southwest Inc. v. Bruce,
998 S.W. 2d 605, 618 (Tex. 1999); Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Driscol, 989 S.W.2d 72
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, pet. denied); Palmer v. Wal-Mart Stores, 65 F. Supp. 2d 564
(S.D. Tex. 1999). Indeed, corporations can be held liable, along with the responsible of-
ficers, for the malicious actions of their officers acting within the scope of their authority.
See Bradford v. Vento, 997 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.); Fonte-
not Petro-Chem and Marine Servs., Inc. v. Labono, 993 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied); ONI, Inc. v. Swift, 990 S.W. 2d 500, 503 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1999, no pet.); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Garcia, 988 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
8. 990 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.).
9. 620 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. 1981).
10. See Pellow, 990 S.W.2d at 313.
11. Id.
12. Id. Another case decided during the survey period reaffirmed the rule that a cor-
poration cannot be held liable for something that occurred before it was formed. See Ed-
monds v. Sanders, 2 S.W.3d 697, 704 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1999, pet. denied).
2000]
SMU LAW REVIEW
holder liability cases. Citing cornerstone cases such as Castleberry'3 and
Old Republic Insurance Co.,14 Texas courts held firm on prior rulings as
to reaching individuals or parent corporations through the alter ego and
the single business enterprise doctrines, generally refusing on the facts of
the particular case to disregard the corporate form.
1. Hall v. Timmons' 5
Hall illustrates the type of evidence necessary to support an alter ego
finding, as well as the necessity of giving full weight to all of the Castle-
berry factors. Kenny Timmons sued his employer, Si-Bon Beverage Cor-
poration, for personal injuries sustained while working in an unsafe
business environment. Timmons's petition also named Robert Hall,
chairman of Si-Bon, as a co-defendant under the alter ego and the single
business enterprise doctrines. In support of his claims, Timmons intro-
duced strong evidence that (i) Si-Bon was undercapitalized, (ii) Hall
made all the decisions for Si-Bon and often overruled decisions made by
Si-Bon employees, (iii) Si-Bon's registered address was Hall's personal
office, (iv) all Si-Bon meetings were held at Hall's office, (v) Hall had a
lien on all of Si-Bon's assets, and (vi) a majority of the checks written by
Si-Bon were made to a partnership owned 99% by Hall.' 6 Instead of
placing all the Castleberry factors' 7 in the jury instruction, however, the
trial court omitted the factors relating to fraud, monopoly, and crime
since it found no evidence of those in the presented facts.18 Based upon
the court's excised alter ego instruction, the jury found for Timmons and
the trial court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict.' 9
On appeal, Hall challenged both that there was "no evidence" to sup-
port the alter ego finding and that the alter ego instruction was legally
defective because it omitted some of the Castleberry factors. Turning first
to the no evidence challenge, the court of appeals concluded that there
was some evidence to disregard the corporate fiction between Si-Bon and
13. 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986).
14. 920 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
15. 987 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, no pet.).
16. See id. at 250-51.
17. Under Castleberry, "alter ego" may be found:
(1) when the [corporate] fiction is used as a means of perpetuating fraud; (2)
where a corporation is organized and operated as a mere tool or business
conduit of another corporation; (3) where the corporate fiction is resorted to
as a means of evading an existing legal obligation; (4) where the corporate
fiction is employed to achieve or perpetrate monopoly; (5) where the corpo-
rate fiction is used to circumvent a statute; and (6) where the corporate fic-
tion is relied upon as a protection of a crime or to justify a wrong.
Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272. The court of appeals noted that Tex. Bus. Corp. Ann. art.
2.21(A)(3) partially overruled Castleberry such that a failure to observe corporate formali-
ties is no longer a factor in proving alter ego and is thus not included in this list. See Hall,
987 S.W.2d at 250 n.2.
18. See Hall, 987 S.W.2d at 253-54.
19. See id. at 250.
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Hall.20 Despite concluding that there was some evidence to support the
alter ego finding, the court also reviewed whether the alter ego instruc-
tion submitted to the jury was complete. Hall stressed that the jury in-
struction represented an improper statement of the law because it
omitted factors for which the court predetermined that there was no evi-
dence-fraud, monopoly, and crime. The court of appeals agreed. On
the strength of Castleberry, the court held that "a proper alter ego in-
struction should include all the relevant factors and consider the total
dealings of the corporation and the individual," not only those factors of
which there is some evidence. 21 Otherwise, the selective instruction risks
treating the alter ego factors as if each factor alone were sufficient to
support an alter ego finding while Castleberry requires consideration of
the totality of factors. 22 After finding the instruction defective, the court
also held that, given the serious contested nature of the alter ego dispute,
the improper instruction probably caused the rendition of an improper
judgment, requiring reversal and remand for a new trial.23 Consequently,
despite some evidence for the jury's alter ego finding, the Beaumont
Court of Appeals stood firm on requiring a complete Castleberry instruc-
tion to support a judgment based on alter ego.
2. Seminole Pipeline Co. v. Broad Leaf Partners, Inc.2 4
Seminole addressed the parent-subsidiary version of corporate veil-
piercing. Twenty-two plaintiffs sued three corporations, one of which was
the parent company of a codefendant, for damages resulting from an ex-
plosion at a natural gas reservoir. The plaintiffs blended the alter ego and
the negligence doctrines in an attempt to reach the deep pockets of the
parent entity. They argued that a wholly-owned corporate structure,
common executive officers, central hiring and payment of employees,
similar business activities, and identical principal business addresses were
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the parent was the alter ego of the
subsidiary. The court disagreed, however, stating that a mere showing of
"stock ownership, a duplication of some or all of the directors or officers,
or an exercise of control that stock ownership gives to stockholders" was
not enough to invoke the doctrine under a Castleberry analysis. 25 With-
out a showing of some wrongdoing on the part of the parent or a showing
of more than just a unity of financial interest, ownership and control,
20. See id. at 251. The court also conducted no evidence review on the jury's negli-
gence, proximate cause, single business enterprise, and medical expenses findings and con-
cluded that all were supported by some evidence. See id. at 251-53.
21. Id. at 254.
22. See id. (citing Castleberry's mandate that "a proper alter ego jury instruction
should include all the relevant indicators and consider the total dealings of the corporation
and the individual."). Even though the factors are listed in the disjunctive, under Castle-
berry they must be considered by the jury in their totality in light of the particular facts and
circumstances. See Hall, 987 S.W.2d at 254.
23. See Hall, 987 S.W.2d at 254.
24. 979 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
25. Id. at 739.
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"Texas courts have refused to make the parent liable for its subsidiary's
torts."
26
3. Gardemal v. Westin Hotel Co.27
Much as in Seminole above, the plaintiffs in Gardemal attempted to
reach a parent company through the doctrines of alter ego and single
business enterprise. Lisa Gardemal brought wrongful death and survival
actions on behalf of her husband's estate against Westin Hotel Company
and one of its Mexican subsidiaries, Westin Mexico, S.A. de C.V., alleging
that the concierge at the Westin Regina Resort Los Cabos (a hotel man-
aged by Westin Mexico) negligently directed her husband and several
others to a dangerous snorkeling beach where he and another hotel guest
drowned in the strong undercurrents. To support her claim, Gardemal
presented evidence that: (i) the two corporations shared common corpo-
rate officers, (ii) Westin exercised various quality controls over Westin
Mexico, (iii) Westin oversaw Westin Mexico's advertising and marketing
operations, (iv) both entities used similar operations manuals and trade-
marks, and (v) Westin Mexico was "grossly undercapitalized. '28 As in
Seminole, the court quickly pointed out that these facts showed nothing
more than a "typical corporate relationship between a parent and a sub-
sidiary."'29 In the absence of "complete domination by the parent," this
does not alone establish an alter ego relationship. The court focused on
the issue of undercapitalization, since that is an important factor in the
Castleberry analysis, but did not find that Westin Mexico's assets were
deficient. 30 In addition, the court determined that there was insufficient
evidence that the operations of Westin and Westin Mexico were so inter-
twined as to constitute a singe business enterprise. 31
C. DRAFTING CORPORATE AGREEMENTS
Given the courts' general judicial reluctance to disregard the corporate
form, it is critical to emphasize the importance of drafting corporate
agreements that clearly contemplate the corporation's identity as an en-
tity and the identity of person signing the document as merely an officer
or an agent of the corporate entity. The effects of corporate transactions,
26. Id. (citing Lubrizol v. Cardinal Constr., 868 F.2d 767, 711 (5th Cir. 1989)).
27. 186 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 1999).
28. Id. at 593.
29. Id. The court held that the evidence actually suggested the opposite since Westin
Mexico (i) maintained separate bank accounts in Mexico, (ii) was incorporated in Mexico
rather than Delaware, like its parent, (iii) fully adhered to corporate formalities and (iv)
separately maintained its assets, staff, and insurance polices. See id. at 594.
30. See id. at 594 (citing United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir.
1985)).
31. See id. at 595. As opposed to the direct piercing actions brought in Hall, Seminole,
and Gardemal, the plaintiff in Schimmelpennick v. Byrne (In re Schimmelpennick), 183
F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1999), brought a "reverse" piercing action in an attempt to reach the
subsidiary of a corporate parent. While the court recognized the validity of a reverse pierc-
ing action under Texas law, it did not undertake an analysis of the theory in reaching its
decision, so we note it only for reference.
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such as mergers and stock sales, must also be clearly contemplated and
dealt with. During the survey period, Texas courts confronted a number
of situations involving the failure to clearly draft documents involving
transactions with corporations, as opposed to individuals, with the corpo-
rate entity in mind.
1. M. D. Mark, Inc. v. Nuevo Energy Co.
32
This survey period brought an interesting pair of Texas cases that ad-
dressed whether or not a merger or consolidation of two corporate enti-
ties constitutes an assignment with respect to the assets and liabilities of
the merged or consolidated entity for the purposes of a contractual re-
striction on assignment. 33 The corporate attorney frequently encounters
this question. It can often be a difficult one to answer depending on the
jurisdictional context and the type of merger involved. 34 The precise
question of whether a merger constitutes an assignment of the assets of
the merging corporation to the surviving corporation had never been spe-
cifically addressed by a Texas court prior to this survey period.
35
In the first of two related cases, M.D. Mark, Inc. v. Nuevo Energy Co.
("Mark I"), M.D. Mark, Inc. sued Nuevo Energy Company for breach of
certain licensing agreements pursuant to which Mark licensed seismic
data to a predecessor of Nuevo. 36 In 1992, the original licensee, TXP
Operating Company, a subsidiary of Transco Energy Company, obtained
Mark's consent to transfer its rights under the license agreements to an-
other subsidiary of Transco called TXPRO.37 In 1994, without seeking
Mark's consent, Transco sold the stock of TXPRO to Paramount Co.,
Inc., and TXPRO remained as licensee under the agreements following
32. 988 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
33. There was actually an equally interesting federal district court opinion from the
Eastern District of Texas that addressed whether a merger constituted a transfer of a claim
pursuant to Fed R. Bankr. P 3001(e)(2) thereby requiring the filing of evidence of the
transfer by the merging corporation if the merger took place after proof of the claim has
been filed. While the court had doubts about the rule's applicability to a merger, it found
no authority and ordered the parties to file a joint document satisfying the rule. See South-
ern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 229 B.R. 119, 121-22 (E.D. Tex.
1999).
34. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Merger or Consolidation of Corporate Lessee as
Breach of Clause in Lease Prohibiting, Conditioning, or Restricting Assignment or Sublease,
39 A.L.R. 4th 879 (1985) (generally discussing state and federal cases in which the courts
have considered whether the merger or consolidation of a corporate tenant constitutes a
breach of a non-assignment covenant in a lease).
35. See TXO Prod. Co. v. M.D. Mark, Inc., 999 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.). But see Docudata Records Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Wieser, 966
S.W.2d 192, 198 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (merging subsidiary
with and into parent did not constitute "sale" of subsidiary). Similarly, the surviving cor-
poration in a merger has long been identified as a "successor" not an "assignee." See, e.g.,
Enchanted Estates Community Ass'n v. Timberlake Improvement Dist., 832 S.W.2d 800,
802 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
36. M.D. Mark, Inc. v. Nuevo Energy Co., 988 S.W.2d 463, 464 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Plaintiff M.D. Mark, Inc. also filed suit against TXO Production
Co. which was appealed to the Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District. This




the sale. 38 Shortly thereafter, TXPRO merged into its parent Paramount,
and two years later, Paramount merged with and into defendant Nuevo,
an unrelated company, in a separate transaction. 39 Mark's suit against
Nuevo claimed that the mergers of TXPRO into Paramount, and Para-
mount with and into Nuevo breached the license agreements because
they "resulted in the unauthorized disclosure of licensed seismic data to
Paramount and Nuevo, [both] non-licensees. '40
Relying on the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Tenneco, Inc. v. En-
terprise Products Co.,4 1 the court in Mark I noted that "[t]he purchaser of
stock in a corporation does not purchase any of the corporation's assets,
nor is a sale of all of the stock of a corporation a sale of the physical
properties of the corporation. '42 Holding that a merger is effectively a
purchase of stock by the surviving company,43 the court concluded that
the prohibitions in the license agreements were not violated since they
focused on transfers of the licensed seismic data itself and did not contain
any provisions addressing mergers, stock sales, or similar change of con-
trol events.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Hedges agreed with the majority's dis-
position in the case, but rejected its reliance on Tenneco and rejected the
focus on whether the merger was a sale of assets or just a sale of stock.
According to Justice Hedges, the license agreements on their face only
prohibited transfers of the seismic data, and a merger is not a transfer.44
Rather, "the rights, title, and interests in property of the merging corpo-
rations vest in the surviving corporation upon merger without further act
or deed and without any transfer having occurred. '45
2. TXO Prod. Co. v. M.D. Mark, Inc.4 6
The second case involved the same clause 47 in another seismic data
licensing agreement. The licensee, TXO Production Co., a wholly owned
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. Id. The license agreements provided that "[Licensee] agrees that data hereunder
shall be for his own use in his exploration and development efforts, and shall not be sold,
traded, disposed of, or otherwise made available to third parties, except it may be shown to
partners as support evidence for joint ventures." Id. at 465. Mark appeared to concede
that the sale of TXPRO stock to Paramount did not violate the terms of the license
agreements.
41. 925 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Tex. 1996).
42. M.D. Mark, 988 S.W.2d at 465 (citing Tenneco, 925 S.W.2d at 645).
43. See id. at 465.
44. See id. at 465-66.
45. Id. at 466 (Hedges, J., concurring). Article 5.06 of the Texas Business Corporation
Act states: "[A]II rights, title and interests to all real estate and other property owned by
each domestic or foreign corporation and by each other entity that is a party to the merger
shall be allocated to and vested in one or more of the surviving or new domestic or foreign
corporations and other entities as provided in the plan of merger without reversion or
impairment, without further act or deed, and without any transfer or assignment having
occurred, but subject to any existing liens or other encumbrances thereon." TEX. Bus.
CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.06(A)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
46. 999 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
47. See supra note 40.
[Vol. 53
CORPORATIONS
subsidiary of Marathon Oil Co., eventually merged into its parent com-
pany. In this case ("Mark H"), the trial court held that the merger vio-
lated the specific provisions of the seismic data license agreement
because the merger constituted a transfer of that data. The Houston
Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District noted that Mark II was a
case of first impression for Texas. Unlike Mark I, decided by the Hous-
ton Court of Appeals for the First District, it did not rely on Tenneco. It
did not treat a merger as the equivalent of a sale of stock by the merging
corporation to the surviving corporation. Accordingly, the court looked
to cases from other jurisdictions for guidance. As the court noted, other
jurisdictions that have addressed this issue, have held that a merger was
not an assignment in violation of the nonassignment clause at least where
the merger was of a subsidiary into a parent, or a reverse merger with no
change in the ownership, possession, or control of the property.48
Mark, however, relied on two cases from other jurisdictions that specif-
ically found that a merger violated the express terms of a nonassignment
clause. The first of those cases was PPG Industries, Inc. v. Guardian In-
dustries Corp.49 PPG involved the granting of rights to certain patents by
PPG Industries to Permaglass, pursuant to an agreement containing a
nonassignment provision. PPG Industries claimed that the nonassign-
ment provision was breached when Permaglass merged with an unrelated
third party. The court in PPG agreed.50 The second case Mark relied on
was Nicolas M. Salgo Associates v. Continental Illinois Properties.51 Salgo
involved a prohibition on assignment contained in a partnership agree-
ment, where a third party acquired a controlling interest in one of the
partners and then merged with that partner.52 Again, as in PPG, the
court in Salgo held that the merger was a violation of the partnership
48. The court cited the following cases involving nonassignment clauses in which
courts had held that a merger did not constitute an assignment: In re Chicago, Milwaukee,
St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 799 F.2d 317, 337 (7th Cir. 1986); Imperial Enters., Inc. v. Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1976); Winchester Constr. Co. v. Miller County
Bd. of Educ., 821 F. Supp. 697, 698, 702, (M.D. Ga. 1993); Brunswick Corp. v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 509 F. Supp. 750, 753 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Paxton & Vierling Steel Co. v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 497 F. Supp. 573 (D. Neb. 1980); Sun World Corp. v. Pennysaver, Inc.,
637 P.2d 1088, 1089, 1092 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co., 182
P.2d 182, 184, 190 (Cal. 1947); Giaise v. Cuccia, 420 So. 2d 700 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Stan-
dard Operations, Inc. v. Montague, 758 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. 1988); Dodier Realty & Inv. Co.
v. St. Louis Nat'l Baseball Club, Inc., 238 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1951); Alexander & Alexander,
Inc. v. Koelz, 722 S.W.2d 311, 313-14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Segal v. Greater Valley Terminal
Corp., 199 A.2d 48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964); Brentsum Realty Corp. v. D'Urso
Supermarkets, Inc., 182 A.D.2d 604 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Sante Fe Energy Resources,
Inc. v. Manners 635 A.2d 648 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). See TXO Prod. Co., 999 S.W.2d at
139-140. As noted by the court, however, the majority of these cases involved mergers of a
subsidiary into a parent. See id. at 141. See Zitter, supra note 51, for cases from other
jurisdictions, primarily involving forward mergers, holding that a merger does violate a
nonassignment clause.
49. 597 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir. 1979).
50. See TXO Prod. Co., 999 S.W.2d at 140 (citing PPG, 597 F.2d at 1095).
51. 532 F. Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1981).




The Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District disagreed
with both the rationale and the outcome of PPG and Salgo.54 First, the
court noted that both cases are distinguishable from the facts in Mark II,
because each involved a merger with an unrelated third party, whereas
Mark II involved a subsidiary that merged into its parent. As a result of
the mergers in PPG and Salgo, unlike the merger in Mark H, a third
party had gained access to a patent it would not have had access to in the
absence of the merger, and a partner was forced into partnership with a
third party (the unrelated entity into which the original partner was
merged) with whom it had not agreed to form a partnership. 55
More importantly, however, the Houston Court of Appeals for the
Fourteenth District, like Justice Hedges's concurring opinion in Mark I,
specifically held that in a statutory merger after the 1987 amendments to
the Texas merger statute,56 "there is no transfer of the rights of the merg-
ing corporation; rather, the rights vest automatically and without further
action."'57 The court noted that while an earlier version of the Texas
merger statute "provided that the property of the merging corporation
was deemed transferred upon the merger, '58 the Texas Legislature specif-
ically intended to make clear in 1987 that "vesting of rights pursuant to a
merger occurred without a transfer or assignment of rights. '59 The court
further noted that the Texas Legislature was specifically trying to avoid
the result in PPG when it amended the Texas merger statute in 1987.60
Because the anti-assignment provisions related only to the transfer of
rights and did not specifically address a statutory merger, the court of
appeals construed the contract language narrowly. The court in Mark II
held that the merger did not constitute transfer or disclosure of seismic
data to a third party, and that the applicable merger statutes authorized
the use of seismic data by a surviving corporation, such as the licensee's
parent company, after the merger. 61
53. See id. (citing Salgo, 532 F. Supp. at 280).
54. See TXO Prod. Co., 999 S.W.2d at 141.
55. See id.
56. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.06 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
57. TXO Prod. Co., 999 S.W.2d at 142.
58. Id. at 142 n.7.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 141 n.3.
61. See id. at 143. It is important to note that based on the courts interpretation of
Article 5.06 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, because no transfer occurs in a
merger by operation of law or otherwise, those wishing to prevent mergers in anti-assign-
ment provisions cannot rely simply upon the parenthetical clause "by operation of law or
otherwise" contained in many anti-assignment clauses; rather the drafter of an anti-assign-
ment provision must specifically reference a merger or change of control to make it an
"anti-merger" or "anti-change of control" clause.
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3. Boustany v. Monsanto CO. 62
Careful drafting was also in issue in Boustany, where the court inter-
preted a stock option agreement under Delaware law. Employees of a
former subsidiary of Monsanto sued Monsanto for breach of contract,
fraud, conversion, and breach of the duty of good faith. The claim arose
out of stock options granted to the plaintiffs pursuant to Monsanto's em-
ployee stock option plans prior to the sale of the subsidiary. Each of the
plaintiffs were granted options to purchase Monsanto stock at a time
when Fisher International Controls, Inc., the company which employed
them, was a subsidiary of Monsanto. The stock option plans provided a
ten year period after vesting in which the plaintiffs could exercise the
options, provided that once a participant's employment had been termi-
nated "by [Monsanto] and its subsidiaries," the participant forfeited the
option unless it was exercised within three months.
63
The dispute in Boustany was simply this: did the sale of 100% of the
Fisher stock by Monsanto to another owner, where the plaintiffs contin-
ued their employment with Fisher, constitute a termination of employ-
ment by Monsanto and its subsidiaries and trigger the three month period
for the exercise of the plaintiffs' options. The court of appeals held it did
not.6 4 The court adopted the plaintiffs' premise that
when there was a change in the ownership of Fisher, plaintiffs' rights
under their stock option certificates were unaffected, because plain-
tiffs were still employed by Fisher in the same management positions
performing the same job tasks; the fact that Fisher was now owned
by a different group of shareholders did not alter the contractual
rights plaintiffs held as continuing employees of Fisher.
65
Citing the often repeated contract construction refrain that "[a] court
may not, in the guise of construing a contract, in effect rewrite it to supply
an omission in its provisions, ' ' 66 the court held the plaintiffs' rights under
Monsanto's stock option plans remained the same before and after the
change in ownership of Monsanto's former subsidiary Fischer. The miss-
ing provision in this court's mind was one regarding a change of control
of the subsidiary. Courts will honor the corporate form; the fact that
Fisher was no longer controlled by Monsanto did not change the fact that
Fisher still employed the plaintiffs.
D. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. Jurisdiction over the Corporation
This Survey period also produced a stream of cases relating to jurisdic-
tion over corporate entities. Following the jurisdictional principles articu-
62. 6 S.W.3d 596 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no. pet. h.) (Rule 53.7 motion
filed Jan. 18, 2000).
63. Id. at 600 (quoting the stock option certificates issued by Monsanto).
64. See id. at 601.
65. Id. at 600.
66. Id. at 601.
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lated by the Texas Supreme Court in Guardian Royal Exchange
Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C.67 and Schlobohm v.
Schapiro,68 personal jurisdiction now collapses into a single inquiry of
whether it is consistent with federal constitutional requirements of due
process for Texas to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In
conducting the constitutionally-required "minimum contacts" analysis, 69
now refined into specific and general jurisdiction, 70 the courts of appeals
have reached some interesting results.
a. Jones v. Beech Aircraft Corp.71
The most interesting opinion in this Survey period relating to the exer-
cise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is Jones. In Jones, the trial
court sustained the special appearance of Beech, a Kansas aircraft manu-
facturer, in a wrongful death action brought by survivors, all foreign na-
tionals, of an airplane crash in New Zealand.72 Beech's contacts with
Texas were limited to maintenance of a homepage on its parent corpora-
tion's website;73 a telephone listing in Houston; four sales representatives
in Texas; conducting business in Texas through wholly-owned subsidiar-
ies; and selling aircraft to Texas residents in Kansas.74 The San Antonio
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and held that
Texas courts had general jurisdiction over Beech. First, the court found
that, despite the general rule that a foreign corporation is not subject to
jurisdiction of a forum state simply because a subsidiary is present and
doing business there, an exception exists where "a close relationship be-
tween a parent and its subsidiary" justifies a "finding that the parent
'does business' in a jurisdiction through the local activities of its subsidiar-
ies."' 75 The court pointed out several factors reflecting the existence of a
"close relationship." Beech had common officers and directors with two
wholly-owned subsidiaries76 amenable to Texas jurisdiction, one of which
employed four sales representatives in Texas, and the other one that re-
ferred to Beech in its signs, vehicles, and literature so that "those who
came into contact with [the subsidiary] were not apprised of the separate
identity of the entities. ' 77 The court held that "the relationship between
Beech and [its subsidiaries] is so close that we conclude Beech does busi-
ness in Texas through the local activities of these subsidiaries. ' 78 How-
67. 815 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1991).
68. 784 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. 1990).
69. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985).
70. See Guardian, 815 S.W.2d at 230.
71. 995 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. dism'd).
72. See id. at 769.
73. Beech was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Raytheon Company. The Beech
homepage appeared on the Raytheon website. See id. at 771.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 771.
76. The subsidiaries were Raytheon Aircraft Services ("R.A.S.") and Raytheon Air-
craft Holdings, Inc. ("R.A.H."). See id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 772.
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ever, the factual basis for the court's conclusion seems like a slender reed
on which to base a "close relationship" sufficient to vitiate the general
rule. 79
The second component of the court's jurisdictional analysis involved
the Beech homepage on Raytheon Company's website. The court ap-
plied a sliding scale categorization of Internet usage for jurisdictional pur-
poses.80 At one end of the scale are situations where a defendant clearly
does business over the Internet by entering into contracts with residents
of other states involving repeated transmission of computer files over the
Internet. At the other end are passive websites, where the posting of an
ordinary website homepage is insufficient to expose a defendant to per-
sonal jurisdiction. In the middle are interactive sites where "jurisdiction
is determined by examining the level of interactivity between the par-
ties."'8 1 The court described Raytheon Company's website, including the
Beech homepage, as "somewhat interactive" with information about em-
ployment, acquiring Beech aircraft, and an email icon.8 2 While the court
explicitly disclaimed that the website alone would be sufficient to estab-
lish jurisdiction in Texas, the court obviously believed it was a significant
factor given its holding that Beech's "ability to solicit sales in Texas
through its subsidiaries and through the Internet, are sufficient to subject
Beech to general jurisdiction in Texas."'83 This holding is especially prob-
lematic given that neither Internet usage, nor the level of subsidiary con-
tacts, gave rise to general jurisdiction independently, but the combination
of the two did just that.
b. Mink v. AAAA Development LLC
84
While the application of the sliding scale approach to Internet usage in
Jones is troubling, the three-part spectrum test is now fully entrenched in
Texas law. The Fifth Circuit formally adopted the approach in Mink. In
Mink, a Texas resident sought to maintain personal jurisdiction over a
Vermont corporation based solely upon its Internet site.85 Characterizing
the issue as one of first impression, the Fifth Circuit relied upon Zippo
79. None of the cases relied upon by the court of appeals for the exception to the
general rule actually found a relationship close enough to alter application of the general
rule. See Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1159-61 (5th Cir. 1983); Conner v.
Conticarriers & Terminals, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 418-19 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1997, no writ); 3-D Elec. Co., Inc. v. Barnett Constr. Co., 706 S.W.2d 135, 139-40 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Indeed, it is especially troubling that the Jones court
did not more scrupulously apply the multi-factor test articulated in Conner. See Conner,
944 S.W.2d at 419 (outlining twelve factors to consider in fusing the parent with the subsid-
iary for jurisdictional purposes).
80. See Jones, 995 S.W.2d at 772-73. The sliding scale approach was first articulated in
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
81. Jones, 995 S.W.2d at 773.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999).
85. See id. at 335.
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Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,86 and adopted its reasoning
that personal jurisdiction depends upon the nature and quality of com-
mercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.87 Embracing
the categorization of three levels of Internet usage (active, passive, and
middle), the Fifth Circuit held that a website that only provides a passive
advertisement is not sufficient contact for the exercise of personal juris-
diction.88 The approach taken by Mink to personal jurisdiction and the
Internet is clearly the prevailing view under Texas law. 89
c. Cole v. Tobacco Inst.90
Another interesting example of the level of corporate activity neces-
sary to give rise to personal jurisdiction under the Texas long-arm stat-
ute91 is Cole. In Cole, the class action plaintiffs sued tobacco
manufacturers and others, including B.A.T. Industries P.L.C ("B.A.T."),
a holding company based in Great Britain. B.A.T. moved to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, contending that it did not manufacture ciga-
rettes, but was merely a holding company that owned a tobacco manufac-
turer.92 The district court rejected this contention, finding specific
jurisdiction permissible under several theories, including stream of com-
merce, the Calder doctrine, 93 and tortious fraud.94 Significantly, the court
also held that general jurisdiction existed over B.A.T. because it had suf-
ficient continous and systematic activity established by: (i) its active mar-
keting of shares of stock in the United States; (ii) its encouragement of
trading on the American Stock Exchange; (iii) its frequent meetings with
American investors in the United States; and (iv) its Texas Commissioner
of Insurance application for approval of an insurance company acquisi-
tion. 95 The court concluded, after examining over 400 exhibits containing
more than 10,000 pages, that B.A.T. "waged a highly integrated campaign
to fraudulently misrepresent the true risks of cigarette smoking. ' '96 Be-
cause a significant number of "victims of this campaign" were citizens of
86. 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
87. See Mink, 190 F.3d at 336.
88. See id.
89. Other Texas courts have embraced this spectrum approach to jurisdiction. See Or-
igin Instruments Corp. v. Adaptive Computer Sys., Inc., 1999 WL 76794, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 3, 1999); Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 742-43 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
See generally Gregory M. Bopp et al., The Internet and American Business in the New
Millennium, 63 TEX. B.J. 26, 28-30 (2000) (discussing personal jurisdiction through Internet
contacts).
90. 47 F. Supp. 2d 812 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
91. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CoiE ANN. §§ 17.041-.045 (Vernon 1997).
92. See Cole, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 813.
93. Under the Calder doctrine, a defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court where the effects of its conduct have been intentionally caused through the pur-
poseful direction of activity toward the forum state, even if the defendant never physically
entered the state. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-90 (1984).
94. See Cole, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 814-17.
95. See id. at 817.
96. Id. at 818.
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Texas, the court denied the motion to dismiss. 97 Notwithstanding the
merits of specific jurisdiction attaching to B.A.T.'s activity regarding ciga-
rette smoking, the contacts giving rise to general jurisdiction, especially in
Texas, seem stretched.
d. BHP de Venezuela, C.A. v. Castieg98
For a more traditional application of general jurisdictional principles in
the context of a foreign corporation,99 consider the Corpus Christi Court
of Appeals' decision in BHP. Eugene Casteig, an employee of BHP En-
gineering and Consulting (E&C), sued E&C, a Texas corporation, and
BHP de Venezuela ("Venca"), a foreign corporation organized under
Venezuelan law, in Nueces County claiming he was entitled to unemploy-
ment benefits under Venezuelan law for consulting services performed in
Venezuela. 100 The trial court denied Venca's special appearance, and the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals reversed for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion.101 Venca's contacts with Texas included the following: (i) a technical
services agreement between Venca and E&C; (ii) Casteig, as an employee
of E&C, performed consulting services for Venca and was paid by E&C;
(iii) Venca purchased $95,000 worth of computer equipment from E&C;
and (iv) the president of Venca was also the secretary and treasurer of
E&C and was domiciled in Texas.' 0 2 The court found that while Venca
had contacts with Texas, they "were neither continuous nor systematic,
but merely fortuitous" and hence insufficient to confer general jurisdic-
tion over Venca. 103 The court similarly rejected specific jurisdiction, find-
ing that Castieg was not "recruited" to work for Venca. 104 Rather,
Casteig was not even recruited by E&C, much less Venca, and was al-
ready an E&C employee when he was sent to Venezuela.
10 5
97. Id.
98. 994 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied).
99. Another case during the survey period reflecting traditional application of jurisdic-
tional principles to a nonresident individual based upon the contacts of a foreign corpora-
tion is Cadle v. Graubart, 990 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, no pet.). In Cadle,
the Beaumont Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of a special appearance by
an Ohio resident who was the president, CEO, sole director, and sole shareholder of Cadle
Co., an Ohio corporation which had not challenged jurisdiction. See id. at 472. The court
premised its holding on the principle that "Ujurisdiction over an individual generally can-
not be based on jurisdiction over a corporation with which he is associated," absent a
finding of alter ego. Id. at 472; see also supra note 4.
100. See id. at 324.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 327.
103. Id. at 327.
104. Id. at 328. Under the Texas long-arm statute, a nonresident defendant is doing
business in Texas if it "recruits Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located
in this state, for employment inside or outside this state." TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 17.042(3) (Vernon 1997).
105. See BHP, 994 S.W.2d at 328.
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e. J & J Marine, Inc. v. Le' °6
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals continued its vigilance in
preventing "fortuitous" contacts from forming the basis for personal ju-
risdiction in J & J Marine. The trial court denied the special appearance
of an Alabama ship builder and sole shareholder in a dispute over the
construction of a shrimp boat.10 7 The court of appeals reversed the trial
court's decision chiefly on the absence of general jurisdiction.' 08 The de-
fendants' contacts were limited to: constructing seven vessels for Texas
residents and deriving $3.5 million from the sale of these vessels; having
telephone negotiations with Texas residents over the construction of two
vessels; and filing applications for admeasurement in Houston'0 9 for all
vessels constructed. 110 As in Castieg, the court again found these contacts
were not "continuous and systematic" and therefore insufficient to permit
general jurisdiction.1" The fact that J & J Marine knew that its shrimp
boats were Texas-bound did not affect the court's analysis, because fore-
seeability alone does not amount to purposeful availment.112 Castieg and
J & J Marine demonstrate that more than random contact with Texas,
even in a business context, is required for general jurisdiction to attach.
f. Transportacion Especial Autorizada, S.A. de C. V. v. Seguros
Comercial Am., S.A. de C. V.113
Just how much more contact is necessary to sustain a denial of a special
appearance is considered in Transportacion. In this case, the trial court
denied the special appearance of a Mexican corporation, and the Austin
Court of Appeals affirmed. The foreign corporation maintained that it
only had offices in Mexico, had no employees or representatives in Texas,
and had only limited contacts with customs brokers and Texas carriers in
Nuevo Laredo.1 4 The court of appeals noted that the record was replete
with additional contacts including: receipt of over 150 payments from a
carrier in Austin for shipments originating in Texas; Texas insurance for
its trucks; traffic tickets issued to its drivers in Texas; trailer exchange
agreements with a dozen Texas companies; a Texas bank account; mail
forwarded from Laredo to Mexico; and travel to Texas to solicit busi-
106. 982 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
107. See id. at 921-22.
108. The court of appeals also held that specific jurisdiction was improper where the
evidence reflected that the shrimp boat was built in Alabama pursuant to a contract negoti-
ated and executed in Alabama. See id. at 925.
109. The court made special note of the fact that the defendant was required to file
applications of admeasurement with the American Bureau of Shipping's national office,
which happened to be located in Houston. The court correctly noted that jurisdiction
could not attach because of the submission of these documents, otherwise Texas courts
would have jurisdiction over every vessel registered with the Bureau. See id. at 927.
110. See id. at 925-26.
111. Id. at 927.
112. See J&J Marine, 994 S.W.2d at 926-27.
113. 978 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).
114. See id. at 720.
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ness.115 With this litany of additional contacts, it is not surprising that the
Austin Court of Appeals found "sufficient evidence of continuous and
systematic contacts with Texas. 1 16 With half of Transportacion's busi-
ness originating in Texas, the court held that it did not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice" for Transportacion to be haled
into a Texas court.' 17
2. The Meaning of "Principal Office"
Often a corollary to jurisdictional questions is determining proper
venue for suits involving a corporation. A pair of cases during the survey
period highlights the manner in which concepts such as principal office,
citizen, and inhabitant should be determined for corporations.
a. In re Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.118
The Texas Supreme Court in In re Missouri explored the concept of
"principal office" under the mandatory FELA119 venue statute.12 0 In a
consolidated mandamus proceeding, the court inquired into legislative
history to develop four conclusions regarding the meaning of "principal
office"' 21 under the venue statute:
(1) a company may have more than one principal office, (2) the "de-
cision makers" who conduct the "daily affairs" of the company are
officials who run the company day to day, (3) a mere agent or repre-
sentative is not a "decision maker" nor is a principal office one
where decisions typical of an agency or representative are made, and
(4) a principal office is not an office clearly subordinate to and con-
trolled by another Texas office. 122
The unanimous court concluded that a company could have more than
one principal office if it "control[s] or direct[s] its daily affairs in Texas
through decision makers of substantially equal responsibility and author-
ity in different offices in the state.' 23
However, courts must look at the corporation's structure to determine
the principal office or offices, ignoring titles of officials and examining
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 721. Compare with J & J Marine discussed supra which also had half of its
business derived from Texas.
118. 998 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1999).
119. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994).
120. All suits under FELA must be brought in the county: (1) "in which all or a sub-
stantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred;" (2) "where the
defendant's principal office is located;" or (3) "where the plaintiff resided at the time the
cause of action accrued." TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.018(b) (Vernon Supp.
2000).
121. The "principal office" is defined as "a principal office of the corporation ... in this
state in which the decision makers for the organization within this state conduct the daily
affairs of the organization." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.001(a) (Vernon
Supp. 2000).
122. In re Missouri, 998 S.W.2d at 220.
123. Id. at 220.
2000]
SMU LAW REVIEW
responsibility and authority. The court fashioned what it described as a
"flexible test" to allow for the myriad of corporate structures. 124 Apply-
ing the new test to the facts at hand, the court found venue improper and
should be transferred to Harris County. 125 Recognizing that the test is
not "precise,"'126 it remains to be seen how it will be applied by the lower
courts.
b. TV-3, Inc. v. Regal Insurance Co. of America127
In the context of a comprehensive choice of law analysis, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas also distinguished
"doing business" in Texas from being an inhabitant or citizen of Texas in
TV-3. TV-3 Inc., a Mississippi corporation, brought a diversity suit in the
Eastern District of Texas against property insurers for breach of good
faith and fair dealing and related claims arising from the denial of cover-
age for the collapse of a television tower in Mississippi.' 28 The insurers
moved to transfer venue to the Southern District of Mississippi under the
venue statute for the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the
interests of justice.' 29 In making its venue transfer decision,' 30 the dis-
trict court conducted a complete choice-of-law analysis, 31 including dif-
ferentiating between "doing business" in Texas from being a citizen or
inhabitant. Surveying Texas law, the court concluded that neither a per-
mit to do business in Texas nor having offices in Texas makes a corpora-
tion a "citizen."'1 32 Moreover, Texas law defines an "inhabitant"
essentially as a citizen-a corporation is an inhabitant of the state of in-
corporation.' 33 In contrast, a corporation is a "resident" where it con-
ducts ordinary business.134 The court therefore refused to give an
expanded reading of the concepts of "resident" and "doing business,"
thus precluding multistate and multinational businesses doing business in
124. Id.
125. See id. at 220-21.
126. Id. at 220.
127. 28 F. Supp.2d 407 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
128. See id. at 410.
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
130. The district court's transfer analysis is thorough, including separately analyzing
each of the nine factors commonly considered in such discretionary transfers. See TV-3, 28
F. Supp.2d at 410-20.
131. In an attempt to prove that Texas law governed the dispute, TV-3 contended that
article 21.42 of the Texas Insurance Code applied, trumping the "most significant relation-
ship" test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. See id. at 414-19. Article 21.42
provides that
[any contract of insurance payable to any citizen or inhabitant of this State
by any insurance company or corporation doing business within this State
shall be held to be a contract made and entered into under and by virtue of
the laws of this State relating to insurance, and governed thereby ....
TEX. INS. CoDE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981). In order to seize protection under this
provision, TV-3 argued that it was a citizen or inhabitant of Texas. See TV-3, 28 F. Supp.2d
at 417.





Texas from taking advantage of article 21.42 of the Texas Insurance Code
for resolution of disputes in Texas and restricting forum-shopping
through manipulation of these concepts.135
E. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
This survey period offers two significant decisions concerning a particu-
lar type of lawsuit against the corporation-shareholder derivative ac-
tions. 136 As these cases illustrate, Texas courts continue to refine both
procedure and substance in handling this type of litigation. The evolving
law in this area requires counsel to be especially vigilant when confronted
with this type of corporate lawsuit.
1. Pace v. Jordan137
Two cases from the Houston Court of Appeals for the First District
address procedure in shareholder derivative actions. In the first decision,
Pace, the court of appeals explored the procedures by which a corpora-
tion regains control over claims asserted by a shareholder purportedly on
behalf of the corporation. Charles Pace, a shareholder of Houston Indus-
tries, Inc. ("HII") 138 sent three demand letters to HII, demanding that
the board of directors terminate the corporate officers and commence
legal action to recover damages for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty
because of bad investment strategies. 139 The HII directors referred the
first two demand letters140 to the board's audit committee for investiga-
tion. The audit committee, with assistance from HII's internal auditing
department, Deloitte and Touche, and outside counsel, investigated the
charges and found they were unsupported. The audit committee reported
its findings, and the board concluded that Pace's demands warranted no
further action. The board notified Pace that it had decided to refuse his
demands.14' Pace sent a third demand letter in July of 1993, reiterating
his claims from the earlier two and adding allegations about the South
Texas Nuclear Project. In September 1993, the board considered Pace's
STNP claims and the disinterested directors, based upon their familiarity
with the events and discussions with federal regulators, voted to refuse
Pace's third demand. 142 The board again notified Pace of its decision. In
response, Pace and another shareholder, Maria Fuentez, filed a share-
135. Id.
136. A shareholder derivative action is brought by a shareholder of a corporation on
behalf of the corporation naming the corporation as a nominal defendant. See TEX. Bus.
CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.14(A)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
137. 999 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
138. Pace was also a former employee of Houston Lighting & Power, a wholly owned
subsidiary of HI, who had been terminated because of a company-wide reduction in force.
See id. at 618.
139. See id.
140. The first demand letter was sent on October 5, 1992 and the second one was sent in
March 1993. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 618-19.
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holder's derivative suit, purportedly on behalf of HII. The trial court ren-
dered summary judgment in favor of HII on the basis that the claims
belonged to the corporation and that suit was barred because of the di-
rectors' previous decision that litigation was not in HII's best interest. 143
In affirming the summary judgment, the Houston Court of Appeals ap-
plied article 5.14 of the Texas Business Corporation Act 144 and reinforced
several fundamental principles regarding corporate control over deriva-
tive actions. First, the court rejected Pace's contention that the case
should be treated as a "demand futile" case because his letters were inad-
equate to be considered a demand. 45 The court opined that "[a] demand
is sufficient if the board of directors had a fair opportunity to consider the
shareholder's claims.' 4 6 Moreover, the remedy for an inadequate de-
mand would be a dismissal, not treatment as a demand futile case.147
The court also made a significant holding regarding whether the de-
mand of one shareholder binds another. Fuentez contended that the trial
court erred in dismissing her cause of action because she never made a
demand on the board, only Pace had. Because Fuentez's claims were
identical to Pace's, the court found "no logical reason why a board's deci-
sion should not bind similarly situated shareholders making identical
claims.' 1 48 On the basis of judicial economy, the court held that "identi-
cal claims, which in actuality belong to the corporation, [may] be simulta-
neously disposed of by one demand."'1 49 In so holding, the court
dismissed as unpersuasive the authority from foreign jurisdictions to the
contrary.150
The Pace court also reaffirmed fundamental principles concerning the
independence of the board and the adequacy of its investigation. The
143. See Pace, 999 S.W.2d at 619.
144. Despite the fact that final judgment was rendered after the effective date of the
1997 amendments to article 5.14, the court of appeals applied pre-1997 law. The court
reasoned that the amendments were in effect at the time of final judgment and that Pace
had failed to object in the trial court to the application of pre-1997 law, thus failing to
preserve error. See id. at 620.
145. Prior to the 1997 amendments to article 5.14, a shareholder had to either make a
demand on the board or show that such a demand would have been futile. See Act of May
25, 1973, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 545, § 37, art. 5.14(B)(2)(b), 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1486, 1508
(amended 1997). Under the current article 5.14, demand futility does not appear to be an
option. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14(C) (Vernon Supp. 2000). Texas has
adopted what is known as the "universal demand requirement" proposed by the American
Bar Association Section of Business Law's Model Business Corporation Act and the
American Law Institute's corporate governance project, Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance: Analysis and Recommendations. For a general discussion of the universal demand
requirement see DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., 2 THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 1562-72
(1998). For a comparison of the Model Act to article 5.14 see BLOCK ET AL., supra at 1663-
64.




150. The court specifically refused to follow: Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194 (Del. 1991);
Avacus Partners, L.P. v. Brian, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 178 (Del. Ch. 1990); and Miller v.
Loucks, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16966 ( N.D. II1. 1992). See Pace, 999 S.W.2d at 621-22.
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court made clear that having invoked article 5.14 by making a demand on
the board, the board's decision not to pursue litigation was controlled by
the business judgment rule.151 The threshold to show that the decision
was governed by something other than sound business judgment is high,
requiring proof of "an ultra vires, fraudulent, and injurious practice, an
abuse of power, and an oppression on the part of the company or its
controlling agency clearly subversive of the rights of the minority, or of a
shareholder, and which, without ... interference, would leave the latter
remediless."'1 52 The court specifically rejected the contention that naming
the directors as defendants made them "interested." The fact that the
directors authorized the disputed transaction did not create a genuine is-
sue of material fact as to the disinterestedness and independence of the
board. 153 Finally, the court reiterated that a derivative suit could not be
maintained merely by a showing that a board's decision was unwise, inex-
pedient, negligent, or imprudent. 154 While Pace applies article 5.14 prior
to the 1997 amendments, 155 it reinforces many significant principles of
corporate control over shareholder derivative actions.' 56
2. Christian v. ICG Telecom Canada, Inc.157
A second decision from the Houston Court of Appeals for the First
District, Christian, involves the interplay between a shareholder deriva-
tive action under article 5.14 of the Texas Business Corporation Act and
the general class action requirements under Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure. In Christian, the court focused on the narrow question
of whether class certification is necessary to assert a shareholder deriva-
151. See Pace, 999 S.W.2d at 622-23, Under the business judgment rule, the board of
directors is presumed to be disinterested and to have acted on an informed basis, in good
faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the corpora-
tion. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
152. Pace, 999 S.W.2d at 623.
153. See id. at 624.
154. See id. at 625.
155. See id. at 620.
156. While the principles of corporate control over derivative actions reinforced by the
court apply with equal force to article 5.14 both before and after amendment, the result
might well have been different had current law applied. Even though article 5.14 requires
a demand be made on the board, the determination to dismiss a derivative proceeding
under article 5.14(F) must be made following a precise procedure.
Specifically, article 5.14(H)(1) allows the determination to be made by "a majority vote
of independent and disinterested directors present at a meeting of the board at which inter-
ested directors are not present... if the independent and disinterested directors constitute
a quorum of the board." TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.144(1) (Vernon Supp. 2000)
Article 5.14(H)(2) allows for "a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or more
independent and disinterested directors appointed by a majority vote of one or more inde-
pendent and disinterested directors present at a meeting of the board of directors, whether
or not the independent and disinterested directors so acting constitute a quorum of the
board of directors." Id. art. 5.14H)(2). Article 5.14(H)(3) allows for "a panel of one or
more disinterested persons appointed by the court on motion by the corporation .... Id.
art. 5.14(H)(3). Hence, the board's vote to reject Pace's demand may have been deficient
if the interested members of the board were present at the time of the vote. See id.
art. 5.14(H)(2).
157. 996 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.).
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tive action. In 1995, the ICG companies' 58 purchased a controlling inter-
est in Zycom Corporation and its two subsidiaries. Zycom minority
shareholders asserted derivative claims on behalf of Zycom against the
majority shareholders of the ICG companies for fraud and breach of fidu-
ciary duty stemming from the alleged dumping of Zycom shares, underre-
ported revenues, and mismanagement of Zycom. 159 The derivative
plaintiffs sought to have a class certified by fulfilling all of the require-
ments of the general class action rule. 160
While it is settled that a shareholder plaintiff bringing a derivative
claim must comply with both the requirements of the "Derivative Suit"
paragraph of Rule 42(a) 161 and the procedures of article 5.14 of the Texas
Business Corporation Act, the Christian court focused on whether a
plaintiff must also comply with the additional class action requirement
under Rules 42(b)-(f). 162 The court rejected the need to comply with
Rule 42(b)-(f) and surveyed the "considerable confusion" between the
interplay of Rule 42 general class action requirements and Rule 42(a)/
article 5.14 derivative actions. 163 The Houston Court of Appeals traced
the confusion to previous versions of Rule 42 which had deleted refer-
ence to derivative actions. 164 The court concluded that: (i) the rein-
troduction of the derivative language into Rule 42(a); 165 (ii) the
provisions in article 5.14 parallel to the Derivative Suit paragraph in Rule
42(a); and (iii) the fact that article 5.14 sets forth detailed procedures
applying to derivative actions, 166 excluding the provisions of Rule 42(b)-
(f), evidenced a legislative intent to establish a separate procedural sys-
tem governing derivative actions. 167 The court further noted the logical
158. ICG Telecom Canada, Inc., ICG Telecom Group, Inc., and ICG Communications,
Inc.
159. See Christian, 996 S.W.2d at 272.
160. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 42.
161. The "derivative suit" paragraph states:
Derivative Suit. In a derivative suit brought pursuant to Article 5.14 of the
Texas Business Corporation Act, the petition shall contain the allegations (1)
that the plaintiff was a record or beneficial owner of shares, or of an interest
in a voting trust for shares at the time of the transaction of which he com-
plains, or his shares or interest thereafter devolved upon him by operation of
law from a person who was the owner at that time, and (2) with particularity,
the efforts of the plaintiff to have suit brought for the corporation by the
board of directors, or the reasons for not making any such efforts. The deriv-
ative suit may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly
and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders similarly situated
in enforcing the right of the corporation. The suit shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice in the manner
directed by the court of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given
to shareholders.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
162. See Christian, 996 S.W.2d at 274.
163. Id. at 274-75.
164. See id. at 275.
165. In 1984, the Texas Supreme Court reintroduced the derivative language by adding
a second paragraph under Rule 42(a) specifically relating to derivative actions.
166. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.14(A)-(L) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
167. See Christian, 996 S.W.2d at 275.
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distinctions between pretrial procedures in general class actions and de-
rivative actions, such as the need for a plaintiff to affirmatively seek class
certification in a normal class action, in contrast to a derivative action
where a plaintiff can maintain a properly-pleaded derivative cause unless
challenged by the defendants. 168 Consequently, the court held that it was
unnecessary to seek class certification and comply with Rule 42(b)-(f) to
maintain a shareholder derivative action, since the proper procedure in
such an action is contained exclusively in article 5.14 and Rule 42(a). 169
III. LEGISLATIVE HIGHLIGHTS: IN ANTICIPATION OF THE
TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS CODE
Although the Texas Legislature did not pass any remarkable amend-
ments or enactments relating to TexAs corporations during its last session,
the much anticipated Texas Business Organizations Code ("TBOC") in
H.B. 2681170 drew a lot of attention. Although the bill died in the House
Calendars Committee, it has already been approved by the House Busi-
ness and Industries Committee and is expected to be passed by the 97th
Texas Legislature.
The TBOC, which has been a work in progress of the Business Law
Section of the State Bar of Texas, the Texas Legislative Counsel, and
Texas Secretary of State since 1995, is a proposed recodification of sev-
eral Texas acts 17' designed to make the Texas code "more accessible and
understandable. 1 172 The monstrous 700-page bill proposes to: (i) rear-
range the statutes into a more logical order; (ii) employ a new numbering
format to facilitate citation and expansion; (iii) eliminate or condense re-
pealed, duplicative, expired, or ineffective provisions; and (iv) attempt to
present the law in modern American English.173 It remains to be seen
how such recodification will indeed facilitate the work of corporate attor-
neys in Texas.
168. See id.
169. See id. Given the stark differences between general class actions and derivative
actions, it is somewhat surprising that there is controversy over the application of Rule
42(b)-(f) to derivative actions. However, confusion does exist. Compare Huddleston v.
Western National Bank, 577 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) with Zauber v. Murray Sav. Ass'n, 591 S.W.2d 932, 935-36 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1979), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 601 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1980). See also PATRICK LANIER &
DENNIS B. HELMER, 3 TEXAS CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE, Shareholder Deriva-
tive Actions, § 122.01[3] (May 1991); 11 WILLIAM V. DORSANEO, III & PETER WINSHIP,
TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 162.01[3] (2000).
170. Tex. H.B. 2681, 76th Leg., C.S. (1999).
171. The Texas Business Corporation Act, Texas Limited Liability Company Act, Texas
Revised Partnership Act, Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act, Texas Miscellaneous
Corporation Act, Texas Real Estate Investment Trust Act, Texas Non-Profit Corporation
Act, Texas Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Associations Act, Texas Professional Cor-
poration Act, and the Cooperative Associations Act.
172. H.B. 2681 § 1.001.
173. See id. § 1.001(1)-(4).
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